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We examine the extent to which bid design provides an informative anchor that 
influences the context in which individuals evaluate willingness to pay questions.  We 
postulate that agents who are uncertain over possible states of nature that may arise when 
consuming a good use bid design as a means to resolve such uncertainty.  Furthermore, 
we hypothesize that the impact of bid design on estimated WTP is less pronounced for 
experienced agents that have observed more draws from nature.  We use three measure of 
bid design to evaluate our conjectures; (i) the mean of bid amounts, (ii) the absolute value 
of the difference between bid amounts, and (iii) the ratio of the mean to the spread.  We 
interact proxies for individual experience with our measure of bid design to evaluate if 
such characteristics attenuate the impact of bid design on WTP estimates.  We find the 
likelihood an individual says “Yes” to a given bid systematically varies with measures of 
bid design.  This suggests that bid design provides an informative anchor and can be used 
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Using Bid Design to Measure the Boundaries of WTP   
 
 1.  Introduction 
 
Most explanations suggested for bid design anchoring effects presume that the responses 
to multiple bid amounts indicate different underlying distributions for willingness to pay. 
The anchoring induced by bid design is viewed as spurious, without information useful to 
estimation of WTP, and a methodological liability.  However, we suggest that at least a 
part of the anchoring induced by bid design is due to unobserved preferences over context 
and uncertainty over which context applies for valuation of the good in question.   
Analysis of systematic components of bid design anchoring effects can provide valuable 
information that may enhance reliability and applicability of WTP estimates.   
 
We consider circumstances in which individual preferences are stable, but systematically 
vary with the context in which the individual is ultimately likely to consume (or 
participate in) the good.  For example, an individual might be willing to pay a given 
amount for a bottle on wine in the context of an evening at home over a casual dinner, 
and another amount for the same wine in a restaurant setting.  An individual might be 
willing to pay a given amount for the same wine to be presented as a house gift purchased 
just before a visit as a dinner guest, but not willing to pay the same amount for the same 
wine for themselves while planning the weekly grocery run because in this context, price 
consciousness might be a larger factor than knowledge about the particular wine in 
question.  Similarly, a consumer who has just tasted a wine under a relaxing and 
attractive winery environment may be willing to pay an amount that they would not have 
been willing to pay if they did not have the associated context to provide memories about 
the experience.  These contextual environments affect valuation of both market and non-
market goods, and are arguably a strategic component of advertising campaigns.  Since 
the variety and types of contexts under which an individual might consume a good are 
potentially innumerable, the framing of valuation questions in non-market valuation has 
become an important issue.  Any amount of uncertainty on the part of an individual over 
context that is unobservable to the researcher would induce random error in WTP 
estimates that would be systematically related to preferences related to context.  This type 
of uncertainty is different from anchoring bias induced by underlying uncertainty over 
preferences or unstable preferences. 
 
We postulate that, for some cases, bid design serves as a proxy for context effects in non-
market valuation.  That is, some part of the anchoring that occurs is a function of the 
context in which an individual could see himself or herself actually paying the specified 
amount for the good.  Schkade and Payne (1994) note that in a verbal protocol analysis, 
respondents to contingent valuation (CV) questions often were recorded asking 
themselves “under what circumstances would I pay this amount for this good” as part of 
their considerations. In this situation, it is not difficult to consider that as the bid amounts 
specified vary over the sample, the contexts that are considered by respondents also vary.  
If this is true, then several implications include: (1) we should be able to analyze how bid 
  3Draft Version      5/31/2007          Preliminary and Incomplete:  Not nearly ready for distribution 
design and anchoring are systematically related to context, (2) some component of 
anchoring induced by bid design is consistent with individual preferences and thus 
valuation of the good, (3) the systematic portion of anchoring should be measurable and 
related to other variables designed to indicate context, (4) the random component of the 
anchoring may include yet other context-specific components that are not identified, and 
(5) increasing context-specific variation in the sample allows for measuring and 
controlling for this source of measurement error.   
 
Contextual variation is not suggestive of bias induced solely by the investigator’s choice 
of measurement method (non-informative), but rather is induced by the combination of 
preference structure and uncertainty over the ultimate context in which a good might be 
consumed.  If this is the case, then efforts to correct for anchoring bias in multiple 
bounded valuation models by attributing differences in WTP distributions solely to 
uninformative anchoring may be missing important components of individual valuation 
of the good in question.  Standard approaches focus on precisely defining non-market 
goods to include as much of the context as possible, so that the good and its context are in 
a sense treated as one in the same.  We consider the alternative approach of allowing 
context to vary so as to model how WTP systematically varies with context. In this way, 
systematic contextual components are included directly into valuation estimates. 
 
In this paper we use bid design and a contextual variable, experience, to measure how bid 
design anchoring effects systematically vary with respondents’ levels of uncertainty 
about context in a repeated question contingent valuation format.  We illustrate how bid 
designs generated to induce anchoring effects in multiple question formats can be used to 
provide information about respondents’ bounds of uncertainty over context.  Further, 
individual characteristics which are correlated with respondents’ level of uncertainty 
about context effects, such as past experience, can be used to estimate systematic 
variations in the boundaries of WTP.  We conclude that welfare estimates may be 
enhanced by using such a model to more completely define the ranges of WTP.  We 
investigate the notion that attempting to estimate WTP as a point estimate may be 
unnecessary and potentially lead to ambiguous results that are better explained by 
viewing WTP as a distribution that is conditional on context.    
 
The effects of bid design and anchoring on dichotomous choice contingent valuation 
results using follow-up question formats are well documented in the literature.  Much of 
this work focuses on how to correct for bias and on measuring the extent to which 
efficiency gains from double-bounded formats relative to single-bounded formats are 
eroded by anchoring bias (see for example Cameron and Quiggen, 1994; Herriges and 
Shogren, 1996; Alberini, Kanninen and Carson, 1997; Alberini, Boyle and Welsh, 2003; 
Alberini Veronesi and Cooper, 2005).   
 
In an extensive study using simulated data, Alberini, Veronesi and Cooper (2005) 
conclude that the relationship among bid design, anchoring, and misspecification of the 
underlying WTP distribution is so complex that in certain cases it may not be possible to 
distinguish the individual effects of any one of these independent of the others.  Using 
Monte Carlo simulations, they show that bid design dummies commonly used to test for 
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anchoring bias can instead pick up model misspecifications.  They conclude that the 
amount of information that is conveyed by standard diagnostic tests for bid design bias 
may be overstated, and that “unless one is prepared to make assumptions about the form 
of the bias, it cannot be corrected for … [and] … without additional information beyond 
the responses to the bids themselves, econometric approaches to identifying and 
correcting for response bias do not appear to be fruitful.”  They conclude that more work 
needs to be done to investigate the role of bid design and how resulting bias is measured 
on the impact of starting point bias, and suggest that alternative approaches include using 
individual characteristics, such as respondents’ views on question format (Alberini et al, 
2005, p. 28). 
 
Most models assume people know their preferences with certainty and use expected 
utility to determine a value when there is uncertainty about future demand or supply 
conditions.  Their own values beyond these sources of uncertainty are typically assumed 
to be known with certainty.  Alberini et al (2003) suggest that this assumption is too 
strong even for market goods, arguing that in many cases, people purchase goods in the 
marketplace not fully knowing how well that good will fit their needs and preferences.  
People who have had more experience with a brand or past purchases of a similar item 
may exhibit less uncertainty over their preferences for a market or non-market good.  
Thus past experience is a quantifiable variable which would be expected to be a predictor 
of uncertainty regarding context, and of the probabilistic range within which WTP is 
likely to be measured.  All else equal, people with more experience would be expected to 
have a tighter range in which estimated WTP falls than people with less experience.   
 
Most models of anchoring assume the anchoring effect is constant over all individuals, 
and don’t vary by personal characteristics (education, familiarity with good in question, 
etc), but there is no reason to believe this to be the case.  Specifically, as Herriges and 
Shogren point out, people who are more uncertain about their preferences, are likely to be 
more susceptible to anchoring if they perceive that the bid amounts provide them with 
information about the value of the good.  In this paper we consider the possibility that the 
degree of anchoring may be systematically related to the bid design in a manner that can 
be predicted by the experiential context in which the individual relates to the good.   
 
A number of methods of detection and measuring bid-design effects exist, depending on 
the purpose of the application.  Alberini et al (2005) discuss commonly-used diagnostics 
for detecting bid design effects, and question the reliability and value of the information 
conveyed by these diagnostics when bid design, anchoring effects and uncertainty about 
functional form of WTP occur simultaneously.  They refer specifically to dummy 
variables on bid sets; but their concerns are likely to apply to other common diagnostic 
tests for bid design effects in double bounded formats including the use of the ‘other’ bid 
amount as a right hand side variable.  More recently,  in the context of multiple (more 
than two) bid formats, Roach and Boyle (2002) and Rowe et al (1996) find that bid range 
spreads (truncated and non-truncated ranges) affect welfare estimates from multiple-
bounded formats, while the means of the bid ranges do not affect WTP.   
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We use a variety of diagnostic tools to detect bid design anchoring effects and their 
correlation with context, including the mean and differences in multiple bid formats.  If 
people who are uncertain about context infer additional information from a bid value, 
then it is not unreasonable to consider that information may also be conveyed by the 
relation between the bid values presented.  For example, a very wide spread might 
exacerbate the sense of uncertainty and lead to confusion, so that the respondent places 
less information value on the bids; while a very narrow spread might suggest that there is 
relevant information in the bid values that are proposed. On the other hand, for a given 
spread, the location of the mean also provides information.  A very wide spread for a very 
high mean might leave an individual in doubt of the value of the information signaled by 
the bid values; while a very narrow spread for a very high mean leave an uncertain 
respondent with the impression that the information value is higher than if the spread 
were wider.  We use mean, spread and the ratio of mean over spread to provide 
information about the nature of bid design induced anchoring effects.  Finally, for people 
who have more experience with the good, we would expect that all of the bid design 
parameters would have less influence on WTP, than for less experienced respondents.  
Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrate these combinations of mean and spread for two different 
levels of uncertainty, as measured by experience with the good.  We aim to test these 
conjectures in this paper. 
 
2.  Model  
 
We consider a model of WTP in which we assume that it is not possible to measure WTP 
as a point due to respondent uncertainty about context. We instead focus our 
measurement on the locus within which WTP may fall given a range of unobserved 
preferences over context.  The boundaries of that locus are a function of respondent 
characteristics, such as experience with the good, which vary by individual.  People with 
more experience are likely to have tighter bounds over which they consider alternative 
sets of contexts, because they have personally experienced a wider variety of contexts. 
We assume that bid design provides context, so that bids are proxies for context.  We 
cannot directly observe contexts that people might consider, and this is a source of 
measurement error.  Thus by varying the bid design systematically over means and 
spreads, we hope to capture systematic changes in the probabilities that ‘yes’ responses 
are given to specific bids.  This model is similar to that of an electron orbiting a nucleus – 
where the measurement process itself hinders the ability to precisely determine where the 
electron lies.  Attempts to measure where the electron may be found at a given time can 
only be accomplished within a range of probabilities, where that range is in part 
determined by characteristics of the atom.   If we accept that in principle we cannot be 
certain of where ‘true’ WTP lies, we can instead concentrate on measuring the boundaries 
of where it lies.  Determining how individual characteristics and contexts shape those 
boundaries becomes important in reducing measurement error. 
 
In this case, there is no reason to believe that bid design would not affect measurement of 
WTP – it should.  One explicit goal of any empirical study would then be to examine to 
what extent measurement error exists to determine the boundaries for WTP, and how 
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those boundaries might be affected by individual characteristics that are correlated with 
degree of uncertainty about preferences.  More experienced individuals are less likely to 
be affected by the bids they are presented with, so their locus contracts.  If this is true, 
then instead of estimating a WTP as a point, economists may be able to design data 
collection to estimate the locus of values within which WTP would be expected to fall, 
and to determine how that locus varies, probabilistically, with individual characteristics.  
Such an approach would indicate a bid design that tests the boundaries of where such a 
locus might fall over a range of experience.   
 
3. The Data 
 
The good is a recreational site visit, with a sample generated from an on-site survey, so 
all individuals had experience with at least one site visit.  Details of the sampling and 
survey design are provided by Rollins et al (2007).  Respondents were asked to indicate 
the numbers of times they had made similar recreation trips over the previous 4 years.  
Respondents whose number of previous trips was above the sample mean were defined as 
“experienced,” those below the sample mean were defined as “not experienced.”  Thus 
experience is a dummy variable where 1 = experience. The null hypothesis that expertise 
is independent of the bid design is tested with an interaction term of expertise and bid 
design parameters. 
 
Data were generated from a bid design based on paired bid amounts randomly and 
independently drawn from the same distribution, which was based on data from a pilot 
stated preference survey. The second bid is not drawn conditional on the first bid 
response. The bids were presented to respondents sequentially in two separate 
dichotomous choice questions, one immediately following the other.  The questionnaire 
was administered by mail, so the respondents saw both bid amounts at the same time.  
Means and spreads (the absolute value of the difference between the two bid amounts) 
were randomly assigned in the bid design according to a design that covered a range with 
four categories:  narrow spreads and wide spreads are combined with high means and 
with low means.  Bid order (high to low or low to high) was also randomized.  Bid design 
diagnostic variables used in the regression model are mean, spread and mean/spread.  
 
A random effects probit specification is used, where the correlation coefficient indicates 
correlation between WTP in the first and second observations for each respondent in the 
panel.  A number of studies use random effects specifications in multiple-bounded 
models.  In general, a double-bounded specification restricts the two bid responses to be 
from the same underlying distribution for WTP.  A random effects specification relaxes 
this restriction, allowing the correlation coefficient (ρ) to pick up the degree to which 
they are related.  The double-bounded model is a limiting case of the random effects 
specification where ρ =1. When the assumption that ρ = 1 is relaxed, “the initial and 
follow-up responses provide a sequence of two single-bounded intervals around the two 
WTP values that are more or less correlated.” (Alberini et al, 1997, page 318).  Alberini, 
Kanninen and Carson (1997) compare WTP results from random effects probit versus 
double-bounded specifications for three data sets to demonstrate that WTP estimates 
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from the two specifications tend to converge with increasing correlation coefficients in 
the random effects specification.  In their study based on three different data sets, the 
correlation coefficients varied from 0.36 to 0.96.  As would be expected, the standard 
errors are lower in the double-bounded specifications in all three cases.  Using a random 
effects model is an effective approach when one does not wish to assume that latent WTP 
is identical in multiple question formats, including with data from double bounded 
question. 
 
4.  Results  
 
DeShazo (2002) and others find that willingness to pay is affected by bid order (low to 
high or high to low); however, we were unable to detect any effect of bid order on the 
model.  This is not surprising since each respondent saw the bids presented in an 
immediate sequence of two questions.  Model 2 in Table 2 shows that the probability of a 
“yes” response tends to increase with the mean and spread associated with the two bids. 
Model 1 indicates that this increase declines with an increasing ratio of mean to spread.  
We shall interpret this below in the context of introducing the effect of past experience 
with similar goods.  Model 1 reveals that the action of experience is not independent of 
the mean and spread; further, experience alone as an independent effect is not significant, 
but its interaction with the ratio of mean over spread is.  Experience is positive and 
significant at the 5% level in Model 3 when bid design is not taken into account.  This 
does not change appreciably when the mean and spread of the offered bid are included in 
Model 2, without the interaction term.   
 
This result is more clearly indicated in Figure 2 where median WTP per trip is plotted for 
the two groups for different levels of means and spreads.  Spreads are given by the values 
listed along the right hand side, and vary in range from s = $3 to s= $50.  Individuals with 
experience = 0 are represented in the solid lines while individuals with experience = 1 are 
shown by dotted lines. Over the entire sample, an individual WTP of approximately $390 
is calculated.  Using regression parameters over the sample data, WTP is calculated 
systematically over the sample for individuals with and without experience for varying 
levels of mean and spread.   
 
We see that the two groups behave differently with respect to how the bid design affects 
WTP.  Both groups are less likely to be moved from the average WTP as the means of 
the offered bids increase for the wider categories of spread. The experienced individuals 
are slightly less influenced by the mean of the bids.  Both groups are influenced by the 
bids as the spread decreases over the range of means, the extent of this influence 
increasing with the mean, but their behavior moves in the opposite directions.  As the 
spread decreases, those with experience tend to undervalue the good as the mean 
increases.  This may be explained as a tendency to mistrust the entire valuation context as 
the pairs of bids are seen to be very high relative to their own WTP locus.  Those without 
experience are more likely to be influenced by the bid amounts at narrower spreads and 
high means, and this influence tends to be an overvaluation.  The tendency of the 
experienced group to be influenced by the mean changes from positive to negative as the 
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spread increases, that is, for spreads of about $7.77, these respondents were not affected 
by the mean, but for spreads above and below this amount, they were affected by the 
mean of the bids, but in opposite directions. 
 
Figure 3 shows Krinsky and Robb 95% confidence intervals (using 1,000 draws) for 
Figure 2 WTPs.    
 
Table 3 provides a systematic breakdown of the predicted probability that a given agent 
(experienced or inexperienced) responds “yes” to a particular bid amount given the other 
bid amount that they observe.  For example, reading across the row for bids of $150, 
table 3 indicates that when the other bid amount is $50, the probability of a “yes” from an 
inexperienced agent is 20.74% and 19.76% for an inexperienced agent.  Moving across 
the row, when the other bid amount is $200, the probability of a “yes” from an 
experienced agent is 28.33% and 46.17% from an inexperienced agent.   When the other 
bid is $300, the probability of a “yes” increases to 80.87% for the experience agent and 
82.66% for the inexperienced agent.  The general trend over the Table 3 is increasing 
probabilities for a “yes” response with increasing “other” bid amounts. 
5. Conclusions 
 
The use of both mean and spread to measure anchoring from bid design effects provides 
information about how uncertainty affects anchoring bias.  These results are significant in 
that the relationship between bid design and individual characteristics may be more 
complex than previously identified.  The idea of “bias” induced by bid design has rested 
on the notion of a true underlying WTP as a point estimate.  We might instead consider 
WTP as a probability that falls within a clear and measurable set of boundaries.  This 
would imply that data collection for estimating WTP from dichotomous choice data 
should incorporate contextual variables that help to delineate those boundaries.  Further 
work includes exploring how these results might vary with different assumptions about 
latent WTP, and use of additional individual characteristics that may be associated with 
boundaries of WTP.   
 
We conclude that further work to define boundaries of WTP loci by systematically 
varying context and bid design might be a fruitful area for future work.  More 
information about the boundaries of WTP may result in the current discussions about the 
extent of anchoring bias to be less relevant than discussions about how to incorporate a 
variety of contextual variables and more precisely measure boundaries.  This would 
ultimately involve the need to include more information about respondent characteristics 
and definitions of the contexts in which people value goods.  Anchoring bias may not be 
a deviation from a ‘true’ underlying point estimate of WTP – but rather an indication of 
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Table 1:  Categories of Paired Bids for Figure 1 
 
Offered Bid  Mean Spread  Type 1  Type 2 
AA low high  YY YY 
BB medium  medium  YN YY 










Figure 1:  Behavioral Model for Interactions Between Bid Design and Experience 
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Table 2:   Random Effects Probit Model Results 
A 
 
Yes/No Response  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
-0.0296  ***  -0.0295  ***  -0.0207  *** 
Offered bid  (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0011)  
0.5504  ***  0.5591  ***  0.5751  *** 
Days on site  (0.1127) (0.1128) (0.0994)  
0.0171  ***  0.0168  ***  0.0155  *** 
Income  (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0029)  
0.0167  **  0.0175  **  0.0170  *** 
Age  (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0062)  
0.2393    -0.3058  **  -0.2615  ** 
Experience  (0.3123) (0.1738) (0.1537)  
0.0109  ***  0.0133  ***     
Mean of offered bids  (0.0027) (0.0022)  
0.0073  **  0.0042  **     
Bid spread  (0.0034) (0.0021)  
0.1198  **         
Mean / Spread  (0.0575)  
-0.2047  **         
(Mean/Spread)*Experience  (0.0975)  
-1.6536  ***  -1.4228  ***  -0.4337    
Constant  (0.4790) (0.4634) (0.3894)   
Log likelihood  -1533.057  -1537.0101  -1569.2792 
0.8529 0.8534 0.8157 
ρ  (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0127) 
Number  of  observations 2996 2996 2996 
Number  of  groups 1498 1498 1498 
 7.91  72.44  Likelihood-ratio test 
 (% significance level)  (98.08) (100.00) 
 
  a   Standard errors shown in parentheses.   
*   Significant at or above the 10% level. 
**   Significant at or above the 5% level.     
*** Significant at or above the 1% level. 
 
A Table 2 presents a subset of regressors for the estimated models, the full sets of regressors are provided in 
Appendix A
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Figure 2:  Mean and Spread impacts on WTP by level of Experience 
 
 





Figure 3:  95% Krinsky and Robb Confidence Intervals for WTP by Level of Experience 
for Different Spreads
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Table 3:  The Influence of Bid Design on the Probability of a Yes Response –  
  $50 Other Bid 
Amount 
$100 Other Bid 
Amount 
$150 Other Bid 
Amount 
$200 Other Bid 
Amount 
$250 Other Bid 
Amount 
$300 Other Bid 
Amount 
























$50  Bid      92.79% 93.68% 98.39% 98.24% 99.74% 99.68% 99.97% 99.96%  100%  100% 
$100  Bid  49.28% 51.98%      67.13% 76.30% 87.83% 88.15% 96.66% 96.66% 99.35% 99.29% 
$150  Bid  20.74% 19.76% 15.04% 22.29%      28.33% 46.17% 57.63% 64.15% 80.87% 82.66% 
$200  Bid  5.03% 4.36% 3.67% 4.25% 2.01% 5.77%      5.59%  18.19%  21.71%  30.52% 
$250  Bid  0.67% 0.52% 0.46% 0.46% 0.29% 0.47% 0.11% 0.85%      0.46% 4.27% 
$300  Bid  0.05% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.03%  0.002%  0.07%     
Note: Cell entries report the predicted probability that an agent of a given type (experienced or inexperienced) will say yes to a particular bid amount given the 
other bid amount that they observed.  The probabilities are evaluated using the sample means for all model covariates that are independent of the bid amounts and 
the actual row and column bid amounts to calculate the mean and spread.  Cell entries can be read as follows – an experienced agent says yes to a $50 bid 
approximately 92.8% of the time when the other observed bid amount is $100.  Draft Version      5/31/2007          Preliminary and Incomplete:  Not nearly ready for distribution 
Appendix A:  Full set of Variables estimated in Table 2 Models 
Yes/No Response  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
-0.0296  ***  -0.0295  ***  -0.0207  *** 
Offered bid  (0.0018)  (0.0018) (0.0011)  
0.5504  ***  0.5591  ***  0.5751  *** 
Days on site  (0.1127)  (0.1128) (0.0994)  
0.0171  ***  0.0168  ***  0.0155  *** 
Income  (0.0033)  (0.0033) (0.0029)  
0.1618    0.1587     -0.2569    
Canoeing  (0.3685)  (0.3691) (0.3215)  
2.7582  ***  2.6333  ***  2.7576  ***  Hunt big 
game  (0.6217)  (0.6221) (0.5411)  
0.8544  **  0.8363  **  0.8748  ** 
 
Rest & 
Relax  (0.4267)  (0.4280) (0.3740)  
1.8876  ***  1.8327  ***  1.5314  *** 
Canoeing  (0.3338)  (0.3344) (0.2862)  
1.7101  ***  1.6629  ***  1.3729  *** 
Kayaking  (0.5999)  (0.6006) (0.5298)  
1.2368  ***  1.1907  ***  0.9600  **  Rest & 
Relax  (0.4376)  (0.4382) (0.3823)  
1.1994  ***  1.1462  ***  0.9479  *** 
Hike  (0.3619)  (0.3623) (0.3145)  
1.2737  ***  1.2302  ***  0.9818  **  Car 
camping  (0.4395)  (0.4404) (0.3841)  
1.9203  **  1.8320  **  1.5618  ** 
 
Back-
packing  (0.9516)  (0.9528) (0.8388)  
2.0183  ***  2.0031  ***  2.4778  *** 
Canoeing  (0.5461)  (0.5444) (0.4625)  
1.9904  **  1.8720  **  2.2807  ** 
Fishing  (1.0673)  (1.0434) (0.9069)  
2.8844  ***  2.8858  ***  3.1302  *** 
 
Rest & 
Relax  (0.9423)  (0.9384) (0.8269)  
0.0167  **  0.0175  **  0.0170  *** 
Age  (0.0070)  (0.0070) (0.0062)  
0.2393    -0.3058  **  -0.2615  ** 
Expertise  (0.3123)  (0.1738) (0.1537)  
0.0109  ***  0.0133  ***  
Mean offered bid  (0.0027)  (0.0022)  
0.0073  **  0.0042  **  
Bid spread  (0.0034)  (0.0021)  
0.1198  **      
Mean / Spread  (0.0575)  
-0.2047  **      
(Mean/Spread)*Expertise  (0.0975)  
-1.6536  ***  -1.4228  ***  -0.4337    
Constant  (0.4790)  (0.4634) (0.3894)   
Log likelihood  -1533.057  -1537.0101  -1569.2792 
0.8529 0.8534 0.8157 
ρ  (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0127) 
Number  of  observations 2996 2996 2996 
Number  of  groups 1498 1498 1498 
 7.91  72.44  Likelihood-ratio test 
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